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We model a project network that uses common methods of improvised explosives 
and metallic liner manufacture for the purposes of constructing anti-armor IEDs. 
Separately, we model a network utilizing advanced 3D printing technology for the same 
ends. We then introduce an interdiction extension to both project models. 
By utilizing decision critical path method models, we examine the differences in 
the critical paths of both project networks. Our finding of note is that the length of the 
network employing advanced 3D printing technology is significantly shorter, even after 
the attacker’s interdiction efforts. Because the length of the critical path of this network 
remains significantly shorter, advanced 3D printing technology can be considered to be a 
“disruptive technology.”  
This flexible modeling can be rapidly implemented when future technological 
“black swans” appear. This modeling provides decision makers with clear, quantitative 
analysis and can be used to drive future intelligence and capability requirements, as well 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B.  DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN TODAY’S CONTEXT .................2 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................7 
D.  HOW DO WE DETERMINE WHAT IS DISRUPTIVE? .....................7 
E.  HOW TO HANDLE FUTURE DISRUPTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES .....................................................................................8 
II.  MODELING THE EFFECTS OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY ................9 
A.  DECISION CPM ........................................................................................9 
B.  PROJECT NETWORKS ..........................................................................9 
C.  ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................................12 
D.  FORMULATION .....................................................................................13 
1.  The Operator Model ....................................................................13 
2.  The Attacker Model .....................................................................14 
3.  Solving the Attacker Problem with Decomposition ..................16 
III.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ..............................................................................21 
A.  THE NON-INTERDICTED LEGACY PROJECT ..............................21 
B.  THE COMPLETELY VULNERABLE LEGACY PROJECT ...........24 
C.  FEASIBLE INTERDICTION REGIMES OF THE LEGACY 
PROJECT .................................................................................................26 
D.  THE NON-INTERDICTED ADVANCED PROJECT ........................29 
E.  TOTALLY VULNERABLE ADVANCED PROJECT ........................30 
F.  FEASIBLE INTERDICTION REGIMES OF THE ADVANCED 
PROJECT .................................................................................................31 
G.  FINAL DETERMINATION ...................................................................33 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................35 
APPENDIX A.  DATA AND OUTPUT FILE (NON-INTERDICTED 
LEGACY NETWORK) .......................................................................................39 
APPENDIX B.  DATA AND OUTPUT FILE (TOTALLY VULNERABLE 
LEGACY NETWORK) .......................................................................................41 
APPENDIX C.  OUTPUT FILE AND DATA (FEASIBLE INTERDICTION 
OF THE LEGACY NETWORK) .......................................................................43 
 viii
APPENDIX D.  OUTPUT FILE AND TASK DATA (FEASIBLE 
INTERDICTION OF THE LEGACY NETWORK II) ...................................45 
APPENDIX E.  OUTPUT FILE AND TASK DATA (NON-INTERDICTED 
ADVANCED NETWORK) .................................................................................47 
APPENDIX F.  OUTPUT FILE AND TASK DATA (TOTALLY 
VULNERABLE ADVANCED NETWORK) ....................................................49 
APPENDIX G.  OUTPUT FILE AND TASK DATA (FEASIBLE 
INTERDICTION ON ADVANCED NETWORK) ...........................................51 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................53 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1.  Illustration of Precedence Relationships ....................................................10 
Figure 2.  Decision Node Example ............................................................................12 
Figure 3.  Parent, Child, Descendent Node Relationships .........................................12 
Figure 4.  Possible Precursors for Explosives Manufacture .......................................23 
Figure 5.  The Invulnerable Project Network .............................................................24 
Figure 6.  The Completely Vulnerable Project Network ............................................25 
Figure 7.  Primary Explosives and Nitric Acid Interdiction .......................................28 
Figure 8.  Primary Explosives, Nitric Acid, and CHP Interdiction ............................29 
Figure 9.  The Non-Interdicted Advanced Project Network ......................................30 
Figure 10.  Totally Vulnerable Advanced Project Network .........................................31 
Figure 11.  “Stuxnet” Interdiction and Spyware Insertion ...........................................32 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AR ArmaLite Rifle 
ATF Alcohol Tobacco Firearms 
BATFE Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives 
CAD computer aided design  
CHP Concentrated Hydrogen Peroxide 
CPM critical path method 
DIY Do It Yourself 
EFP Explosively Formed Penetrators 
ETN Erythritol Tetranitrate, a powerful booster explosive 
GSE Government Sponsored Entities 
HMTD Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine 
HMX Cyclotetramethylene-tetranitramine, similar to RDX 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
NSA National Security Agency 
PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique  
RDX Cyclotrimethlenetrinitramine, a highly brisant explosive 
SEC Solution Elimination Constraint 
TATP Triacetone Triperoxide 










The “black swan” technological development that motivates this particular 
analysis is the emergence of advanced additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, which is 
rapidly growing in capability while decreasing in price. We therefore assess the changes 
in network structure and resiliency that take place when a nefarious actor acquires such 
technology and uses it to clandestinely produce weapons. We consider advanced 3D 
printers as a candidate for those technologies that have become known in the popular 
discourse as “disruptive technologies.” Our objective is to propose a definition for the 
term “disruptive technology” and illustrate how to quantitatively assess whether or not 
any given technology fits this definition. We thus introduce a method that utilizes 
decision critical path method (CPM) models. Decision CPMs are infinitely scalable and 
rapidly implementable. This makes decision CPMs the ideal tool for assessing 
technological “black swans” once they emerge.   
To illustrate how this process works, we consider two separate project networks. 
The first utilizes common methods for improvised explosives manufacture and is referred 
to as the legacy project network. Additionally, we pair these explosives with metallic 
liners to produce a particular type of improvised explosive device (IED) known as an 
explosively formed penetrator (EFP). These devices were known for their ability to 
remain lethal at significant distances and were responsible for many of the casualties 
suffered in Operation Iraqi Freedom. To produce an effective version of this device 
without ready access to military explosives of sufficiently high brisance would require a 
complex series of operations; to safely build such devices in any significant quantity 
would take a bomb maker of some skill. Repeatedly completing these tasks in the face of 
an observant adversary, while certainly possible, would likely require considerable time 
unless the bomb-maker, referred to henceforth as the “operator,” did not consider 
personal survival a priority.  
The second project network utilizes advanced 3D printing, capable of printing 
complex molecules out of ubiquitous feedstocks, to produce an IED and is referred to as 
the advanced network. The length of time required for project completion in this network 
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is noticeably shorter (on the order of 60% less). Additionally, this network is far less 
susceptible to interdiction efforts undertaken by an attacker and is presumed to require 
less skill on the part of the bomb maker. 
Our decision CPM model, referred to as DISTECH, allows an analyst to utilize 
standard project management software to model any type of adversary project desired, 
whether it employs a candidate disruptive technology or not. DISTECH then implements 
an attacker extension in an effort to maximally delay by interdicting tasks that maximize 
the length of the resulting critical path. The length of time required to complete a project 
corresponds to the length of the “critical path.” By comparing the differences in the 
lengths of the post-interdiction critical paths between a legacy project network and an 
advanced project network employing a candidate disruptive technology, an analyst can 
determine whether the candidate technology is truly disruptive and make quantitative 
assessments about the magnitude of the disruption posed. As such, we can now assert that 
the proper way to address disruptive technologies is not to attempt to predict the future, 
but rather to rapidly respond in a measured, intelligent fashion. What is more, the 
DISTECH model introduces a new family of SKIP variables to help assess the cost of 
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When the printing press emerged in the middle of the 15th century, the Catholic 
Church and ruling nobility could not foresee the consequences such a disruptive 
technology would have. Mass-produced translations of the Bible in native languages 
contributed greatly to massive social and political upheavals that would forever change 
the course of European and world history during the German Peasant’s War and the 
Protestant Reformation, among others. Spreading these alternative interpretations of 
scripture and their attendant social philosophies was a network of scholars and printers 
who labored in a loose structure of associations we today might represent as a project 
network model. If one were to observe this project network both before and after the 
introduction of the printing press, we would observe that its structure had changed 
significantly. Producing any given number of texts now required far less expenditure of 
effort and support and made combating the spread of these ideas all the more difficult. 
One would observe similar effects today in employing disruptive technologies to develop, 
for example, improvised weapons. 
One cannot plausibly hope to foresee what technological “black swans” will 
appear in the future. Decision critical path method models can, however, allow one to 
rapidly assess such effects once a disruptive technology emerges. This in turn can aid 
decision makers in choosing how to respond to disruptive technologies and those 
adversaries who employ them. The key to dealing with disruptive technology is therefore 
not in prediction or in attempting to restrain human technological or social evolution, but 
rather the rapid adaptation of current security paradigms and procedures to the new 
realities introduced by disruptive technologies. 
Western societies with a robust middle class will likely be the first to experience 
the effects of disruptive technology. This is true for several reasons. First, Western 
governments maintain stringent controls on military hardware. Storage requirements, 
physical security, and regular inventories help ensure military ordnance and related 
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hardware does not fall into unauthorized hands [1]. Nefarious actors must therefore 
utilize various illicit or improvised methods to acquire weapons in support of their 
agendas. These weapons include everything from firearms and explosives to even 
rudimentary chemical agents. In contrast, countries like Iraq and Afghanistan are already 
awash in military hardware and the governments struggle to provide basic services and 
border integrity, let alone maintain accountability for their own equipment. Conditions 
like these make the adoption of disruptive technologies uneconomical considering how 
easily conventional munitions can be attained. Therefore, stringent controls provide the 
incentive to adopt disruptive technologies while higher levels of disposable income 
provide the means to acquire them in Western societies. Additionally, high levels of 
education and easy capital formation result in such technologies primarily being 
developed in liberal democracies. Since these societies tend to be the main developers of 
such technologies, it stands to reason they will also be the first to experience the 
consequences, both good and bad.  
Future disruptive technologies will likely alter the balance of power very 
differently than they have in the past. The airplane, a disruptive technology that 
fundamentally changed the way wars are fought, still requires the vast industrial base of a 
nation state to produce. It is therefore highly implausible that individuals could produce a 
capable combat aircraft of their own in any significant quantity. Because of this, the 
aircraft was disruptive only at the level of competing nation states. Future disruptive 
technologies will likely alter the balance of power between nations and legacy industries 
relative to the individual. The capability of individuals to threaten social, economic, and 
security norms will likely increase due to the highly decentralized and disintermediating 
nature of powerful new disruptive technologies.   
B. DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN TODAY’S CONTEXT 
The Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting on December 12, 2012, shocked 
America and ignited a firestorm of debate concerning the nature and extent of current 
firearm regulations. Proponents of expanded regulation claimed, and still do, that such 
restrictions are needed in the interest of community safety, while detractors questioned 
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the efficacy of such restrictions. Meanwhile, Cody Wilson, a 25-year-old former student 
of the University of Texas School of Law, was fervently working on overcoming the 
technical challenges associated with 3D printing firearms and firearms components, or 
so-called “wiki weapons” [2]. Effective wiki weapons would, by design, circumvent any 
possible regulatory actions. Initially, members of the firearms community had a rather 
blasé attitude regarding Wilson’s work, but in the wake of Sandy Hook and the renewed 
support by regulators to ban and/or confiscate high capacity magazines and semi-
automatic rifles, interest in Wilson’s work intensified.  
Early in 2013, Wilson posted a video to YouTube of himself shooting an AR-15 
rifle with a plastic, fully 3D-printed lower receiver. The lower receiver of the AR-15 rifle 
is considered by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) as 
the functional component that makes the AR-15 a firearm and is thus regulated as such. 
Early prototypes failed after only a few rounds. Undeterred, the wiki weapon community 
quickly developed a lower receiver capable of firing over 650 rounds of 5.56mm 
ammunition, which Wilson himself test fired in a YouTube video in the early spring of 
2013. Wilson, however, was not satisfied. He wanted to design and freely distribute a 
fully 3D printable firearm. On May 6, 2013, the single shot Liberator pistol was posted to 
Wilson’s online computer aided design (CAD) file repository, DEFDIST.org [2]. In 
Wilson’s words, it served as a “demonstrative spectacle” of how modern law 
enforcement and security paradigms could be undermined with relative ease, given 
current 3D printing technology [3]. 
Regardless of one’s personal beliefs regarding arms control, one must concede 
that 3D printing has already begun to upset the regulatory paradigms in place around the 
world. The Liberator was downloaded more than 100,000 times before the United States 
Department of State ordered Wilson to take the Liberator CAD file offline, despite the 
fact that this response came within 24 hours of the initial post. The State Department 
claimed the design was in fact government property under the Cold-War-vintage 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations law. Interestingly enough, much of the 
downloading was completed by persons in regions with much stricter gun control 
regulations, such as Europe and Asia. Soon afterward, multiple anonymously posted 
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videos emerged on YouTube from around the world, showcasing individuals firing their 
Liberator pistols. So, despite the direct intervention of the U.S. State Department and the 
stringent arms control regulations in place in many foreign countries, novice do-it-
yourself (DIY) gunsmiths had succeeded in acquiring for themselves this first generation 
of wiki weapons [2],[4]. CAD files for high-capacity magazines, AR lower receivers, and 
the original Liberator pistol and numerous improved repeating firearm designs remain 
available online in such locations as The Pirate Bay and multiple other file sharing sites. 
With the ability to turn lines of code into physical objects, these so-called “physible” files 
are, and are highly likely to remain, outside of the ability of regulators to control.  
The plight of regulators and law enforcement is unlikely to improve. Already, 
desktop printers that print with more rugged materials, like steel and aluminum, are 
reaching price points that put them within reach of the average handyman. In as little as 
25 years, it may well be within the financial means of average citizens to purchase 3D 
printers capable of assembling complex molecules out of cheap and widely available 
feedstocks of hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, and oxygen. Machines capable of printing 
simple protein structures and other biological materials have already been built by 
University of Illinois chemist Martin Burke [5], [6] and researchers from Carnegie 
Mellon have successfully printed a human heart [7]. Consumer advocates and the medical 
industry have reason to believe that these advances will dramatically lower the costs of 
highly specialized medications needed to fight aggressive cancers and other disease. The 
potential social benefits of this technology are obviously immense. If, however, the 
history of 3D plastic printers is at all illustrative, it seems a forgone conclusion that such 
advanced 3D printing technology will also be repurposed to produce weapons.  
Desktop 3D metal printers and computer-controlled desktop routers for machining 
metal are already capable of producing high-quality liners for shaped charges and 
Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs). Advanced printers capable of assembling one’s 
medication would likely by design also be capable of producing high-quality explosives 
like RDX and HMX. Thus, successive generations of wiki weapons will likely be far 
more capable than their predecessors. Instead of single-shot pistols, curious wiki weapons 
tinkerers (or terrorists) might be able to produce high quality anti-armor IEDs without the 
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network of support and specialized equipment production of such devices presently 
require. Future IED production networks, enabled by advanced 3D printing, will exhibit 
far less vulnerability to interdiction than their present-day counterparts. For example, 
bulk purchases of suspicious materials will no longer serve as a “red flag” for those 
agencies tasked with the interdiction of illegal weapons manufacture, as legitimate use of 
the required materials would likely be very common. 
Another disruptive technology, cryptology, has been the center of controversy 
since the so-called “Crypto Wars” in the mid-1990s where the U.S. government 
attempted to classify cryptology as weapon and install “clipper chips” in the personal 
devices of American citizens [8], [9]. The “clipper chips” themselves were hacked and 
the issue was promptly dropped on the grounds that the regulations were unenforceable 
and possibly unconstitutional. The issue has resurfaced again in the wake of the San 
Bernardino terrorist attack on December 2, 2015, and the FBI’s inability to access the cell 
phone of Sayed Farooq, one of the attackers. The outcome of the FBI’s attempt to compel 
Apple to circumvent the security features on Farooq’s phone was inconclusive as an 
anonymous third party, widely believed to be the Israeli firm Cellebrite [10], was able to 
hack Farooq’s iPhone after weeks of analysis. Regardless, hundreds of other encrypted 
communications applications will likely confound future investigations. Further 
complicating the issue, many of these applications have been developed in jurisdictions 
not subject to U.S. law.  
Former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden’s 
revelations indicate several limitations of American and foreign surveillance efforts in the 
wake of the emergence of easily implementable cryptographic technologies. Browsers 
like TOR (The Onion Router) and the disk encryption system Truecrypt, when used 
correctly, have complicated NSA collection efforts [11]. Recent news seems to indicate 
that the NSA has been able to at least partially penetrate these technologies in the 
intervening four years. With open-source codes and rapidly rising demand for secure chat 
applications like Signal however, the state of the art in personal privacy and anonymity is 
changing every day [11], [12].  
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Disruptive technologies like cryptology and the blockchain have led to other 
novel inventions like cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin being just one of a growing number [13–
16]. Bitcoin alone has allowed for near total anonymity in commerce, giving rise to 
alternative marketplaces on the so called “Deep Web” such as The Silk Road. Even after 
The Silk Road was shut down, numerous other online vendors flourished [13]. When 
Cyprian officials attempted to confiscate large sums of money from wealthy depositors to 
cover sovereign debt payments, Euros deposited in Cyprian accounts were anonymously 
exchanged for Bitcoins almost overnight and then exchanged again into the currency of 
whatever tax haven had been chosen [14], [15]. Moreover, because Bitcoin maintains a 
public ledger of all “transactions,” it has proven remarkably secure and is giving some 
people reason to question the need for state-mandated monopolies like the U.S. Federal 
Reserve. Additionally, a small but ever-growing amount of economic activity is 
conducted outside the scope of centralized oversight, further undermining the legitimacy 
of various regulatory agencies in the eyes of many. Government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs), public institutions and regulators are not the only parties to be threatened by 
implementations of blockchain technology. Brooklyn-based software developer 
ConsenSys aims to provide the same services as Google, utilizing a distributed network 
of computers that synchronizes information exchange via a blockchain implementation 
known as Ethereum [16]. 
In the era of technological “black swans,” both society and legacy institutions (be 
they military or civilian) must learn to rapidly adapt to an individual’s ever-changing 
capabilities landscape. Before one can properly adapt to these changes, one must first 
understand their magnitude. We provide a method to assess the impact of such a change 
and, if possible, determine effective interdiction plans against project networks in which a 
new, disruptive technology might be in play. To do so, we will utilize decision critical 
path method (decision CPM) models to analyze the changes in network structure and 
resiliency that take place when an adversarial network engaged in the production of 
powerful explosives like RDX for the purpose of constructing anti-armor IEDs, gains 
access to a disruptive technology like advanced 3D printers. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Decision critical path method (CPM) models and other program evaluation and 
review technique (PERT) models have been used to manage complex industrial tasks 
such as manufacturing and distribution of drugs and weapons [17]. Interdiction models, 
such as those in Brown et al. [18], Skroch [19], Brown, et al. [20] and Nesbitt [21] have 
been used to determine how to optimally delay such a project. We will use such models 
to illustrate the increased resiliency of future illicit networks that are enhanced with 
disruptive technologies, such as advanced 3D printers. Those technologies which 
significantly alter the results of the decision CPM model, should receive the designation 
of “disruptive” while those which do not significantly alter the results as simply “novel.” 
D. HOW DO WE DETERMINE WHAT IS DISRUPTIVE? 
Disruptive technologies shorten critical paths and/or increase the resiliency of a 
network. We thus introduce a model for the building of sophisticated anti-armor IEDs, 
utilizing present-day technology. We also introduce a model for the building of such 
weapons using a disruptive technology like advanced 3D printers, capable of printing 
explosives from simple feedstocks of common elements like hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, 
carbon and possibly utilizing cryptographic technologies to anonymize acquisition of 
CAD files for explosive materials. Attacker extensions are implemented in both models 
in an effort to stop or delay the production of these weapons.  
Networks have been used singularly to model decision CPMs [22]. When 
represented as such, the time to complete the project is the length of the longest path 
through the network, also referred to as the critical path. The operator seeks to minimize 
the length of this path as much as possible. The attacker seeks to maximize it. By 
comparing changes in the length of the critical paths of both models we will be able to 
make the determination as to whether a technology is truly disruptive. Only those 
technologies that significantly shorten the length of the critical path despite the best 
efforts of someone trying to interdict the project should be classified as disruptive. 
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E. HOW TO HANDLE FUTURE DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Few, if any, quantitative analysis tools presently exist to inform decision makers 
about the impacts of any given disruptive technology. Leadership must make do with the 
advice of purported experts claiming to have the ability to foresee the “unknown 
unknowns” or “black swans” on the horizon. Whatever merit this method may have, it is 
difficult for objective science to quantify. In an effort to remedy this, it is the purpose of 
this thesis to advance the use of flexible and adaptive modeling tools that can be rapidly 
implemented once a disruptive technology emerges. Decision CPMs can be developed 
and analyzed to determine the impacts of future disruptive technologies when these can 
be represented as partially ordered tasks in a project in relatively little time. What is 
more, decision CPMs can provide realistic estimates of one’s ability to interdict or delay 
those actors employing a disruptive technology. These qualities make decision CPMs the 
ideal choice for aiding leadership in making intelligent decisions regarding emergent 















II. MODELING THE EFFECTS OF 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
A. DECISION CPM 
The disruptive technology, or DISTECH, model considers a series of interdictions 
across two separate project management models to determine an optimal attack set 
against an adversary project network. An optimal attack is the one which maximally 
lengthens the operator’s critical path (i.e., maximally delays project completion time). It 
considers production projects utilizing both present day and projected future disruptive 
technologies to quantify anticipated changes in network resiliency and structure. We use 
standard project management software (e.g., Microsoft Project [23]) to represent the tasks 
required for completion of the operator’s project, as well as precedence relationships 
among project activities, and the decisions regarding procurement methods. The objective 
of the operator is to choose the optimal path to complete his project despite the 
interdiction efforts of the attacker. The attacker seeks to optimally delay, and if possible 
stop, the industrial project of the operator. Disruptive technologies are considered to be 
those technologies that either significantly shorten the operator’s chosen critical path or 
significantly degrade the attacker’s ability to interdict that path though the network. 
B. PROJECT NETWORKS 
Project networks have been used extensively to model these types of processes 
[21], [22]. Moder, Phillips, and Davis specifically define a project as a distinct family of 
tasks. Each task has a specified duration and may require a finite amount of resources to 
complete. Additionally, these tasks have specified precedence relationships between their 
ordered pairs. Some tasks may also have a specified amount of lag in between the 
completion time of the first task, referred to as the predecessor in the ordered pair, and 
the earliest possible start time of the subsequent task called the successor in any given 
ordered pair [21],[22]. 
Network diagrams are used to represent these tasks and associated precedence 
relationships. Tasks are represented as nodes. In this network diagram (see Figure 1), 
 10
nodes are drawn as rectangles with rounded corners. An arc, usually drawn as an arrow 
from the rightmost edge of predecessor task to the leftmost edge of the successor task, 
represents the precedence relationship between the two tasks [21], [22]. One such 
precedence relationship between tasks t1 (Buy Erythritol) and t2 (Nitrate Erythritol) is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Project management tools take these network models (including 
their tasks, precedence relationships, task durations, resource availability etc.) as inputs 
and produce an optimized schedule for completion of the tasks in the project. A schedule 
is considered feasible if it has start and end times that honor task durations, lag times, 
precedence relationships and resource constraints. A schedule is deemed optimal if it is 
both feasible and provides the earliest possible time for project completion [21], [22].  
Figure 1.  Illustration of Precedence Relationships  
 
Two tasks, t1 (Buy Erthritol) and t2 (Nitrate Erythritol) are shown with the proper 
precedence relationship. The time required to complete t1 is the difference between t1’s 
START and END time. A specified lag time (Lagt1,t2) must elapse before task t2 can start. 
It is possible for Lagt1,t2 to be equal to zero. The horizontal arrow represents the 
precedence relationship between t1 and t2. The grey dotted arrows above the tasks 
represent the flow of the necessary  resources into the task nodes. The types and 
quantities of resources needed to complete a task is represented by reqrt1 and reqrt2.  
In project network models, strict task dependence must be enforced from the start 
task to the finish task. This task dependence is illustrated above via the arrow from t1 
(Buy Erythritol) to t2 (Nitrate Erythritol). As a task ends, a lag time measured in days is 
initiated. It is possible for this lag time to equal zero or less. Upon completion of this lag 
 11
time, the next task (the successor) can begin. In a majority of cases, all predecessors must 
be complete before a successor task can begin. 
Decision nodes represent tasks that only require one (or some) successor tasks to 
be completed. Decision nodes allow us to model alternative means of preparing for a 
task. One of the best examples of this is demonstrated in Skroch [19] whereby the author 
provides three alternative means for the enrichment of weapons grade uranium [19], [21]. 
Figure 2 is an example whereby the operator is able to pursue two separate means of 
acquiring an important precursor chemical, nitric acid. In the DISTECH model, the 
operator chooses which method he wishes to use to procure nitric acid, Highly 
Improvised or Improvised. Both the Highly Improvised and Improvised nodes are 
referred to as Summary Tasks. The tasks that constitute the Highly Improvised and 
Improvised methods of producing nitric acid are called child nodes. It is possible that 
some of these child nodes are summary tasks themselves. The tasks that make up these 
child summary tasks are referred to as descendent nodes. This relationship structure is 













Figure 2.  Decision Node Example 
 
The decision node (task) “Get Nitric Acid,” only requires one of the two parallel sets of 
subordinate summary tasks to be completed for the operator  to acquire nitric acid, a 
precursor chemical used for the manufacture of the explosives RDX, a secondary 
explosive, and ETN, a booster explosive. 
Figure 3.  Parent, Child, Descendent Node Relationships 
 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions are made throughout the DISTECH model. 
 The operator behaves optimally in order to complete the project 
 The operator always pursues those tasks that will result in the quickest 
completion of the overall project. 
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 Operator is aware of the interdiction efforts of the attacker and allocates 
his efforts accordingly 
 The attacker will always attack the vulnerable nodes that lengthen the 
critical path the most. 
D. FORMULATION 
The DISTECH operator model is an integer linear program. That operator model 
is implemented as a decision-CPM. The attacker extension influences the duration of the 
operator CPM. The operator model seeks to find the shortest critical path through the 
project network, thus resulting in the earliest completion time possible. DISTECH allows 
the operator to choose various options for completing his project via binary decision 
variables that serve to track the operator’s progress. The attacker model imposes penalties 
on vulnerable tasks to optimally delay the operator. These penalties often force the 
operator to choose processes that, while they may be invulnerable to attack, result in 
significant delays in the project’s completion time. 
1. The Operator Model  
SETS 
k K     Tasks (nodes)     
( , )i j P K K    Precedence Relationship. Task i  precedes task j  (arcs)   
s S K     Summary Tasks 
d D S     Decision Summary Tasks 
sk K K     Children of Summary Task k 
start K    Distinguished Start Task 
finish K    Distinguished Finish Task 
 
PARAMETERS 
kd    Duration of task k [days] 
,i jlag     Required delay between completion of task i and start of j [days] 
 
VARIABLES [units] 
Z     Objective [days] 
kEST     Earliest start time for task k [days from start] 
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Each project has a final set of tasks completed in set K. A project is complete 
when a set of tasks in K connects tasks designated as start and finish in the set K. The 
objective function (a0) expresses the estimated time to completion of the project, 
measured in days. Each constraint (a1) ensures that the earliest start time for a task is 
greater than or equal to the completion time of each of its predecessors, plus any lag time 
between the two tasks [21], [22]. Each constraint (a2) requires that at least one child of a 
completed decision node is also completed.  Note that each decision node is a summary 
node, and so the notation Kd is consistent with our definition of Ks.  Each constraint (a3) 
ensures that if a non-decision summary task is completed, each of its children is 
completed. Constraint (a4) ensures the start task is completed, thus ensuring the entire 
project is completed with a feasible set of decision nodes and their resulting subtasks 
completed.  
2. The Attacker Model 
The attacker model seeks to maximally delay the completion time of the operator 
model by lengthening its critical path. The attacker model also operates on both operator 
project models. In the attacker model, attack sets can change based on the assumed 
vulnerability of a given node to interdiction.  
In the base case, all nodes (tasks) in both operator project models are considered 
vulnerable to interdiction. This results in the attacker model rapidly imparting significant 
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delays on the operator, possibly extending the earliest start date of the finish task to a 
virtual infinity. This effectively stops the operator entirely. Assuming that all nodes in the 
operator model are vulnerable may not reflect reality. Many tasks in the project model 
constructed to motivate the discussion concerning the DISTECH model (the production 
of IEDs), require only the most rudimentary resources [24].Therefore, assuming all nodes 
in the network are vulnerable to interdiction leads to excessively optimistic estimates 
about the attacker’s capability to delay the operator. Thus, in an effort to make the results 
of the attacker model more realistic, we make certain nodes (tasks) invulnerable to attack. 
The attacker model is agnostic about the actual means of attacking vulnerable nodes. The 
attacks can come in the form or kinetic operations or otherwise. The only pertinent 
information required is that a plausible means of interdiction exists and an estimate of the 
amount of delay imparted on the operator model should such an interdiction take place. 
After our baseline “total vulnerability” assessment, we then begin to consider only 
plausible attacks. 
 




max_attacks    Maximum number of attacks [cardinality] 
kdelay    Additional delay if task k attacked [days] 
_ kpen skip    Penalty for each day of delay skipped on an attacked arc. [Days/day] 




kY     1 if task k attacked, 0 otherwise [binary] 
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Equation (b0), the objective function, expresses the length of the longest path the 
operator must take through the network, including penalties for skipping any delays that 
attacks might impose. Similar to constraint (a1), constraint (b1) ensures that the earliest 
start time for the next task is greater than or equal to the completion time of its 
predecessor plus any delay; if the task has not been attacked the operator can skip this 
delay at no cost. Constraints (a2), (a3) and (a4) are identical to the constraints in the basic 
operator model and constrain the operator’s actions in the same ways. Constraint (b2) sets 
an upper bound on the number of attacks that can be carried out against a project 
network. Constraint (b3) establishes an upper bound on the duration of the delay that can 
be skipped for a given task, assuming the task has not been attacked. If this constraint 
were not enforced, it would become possible for the operator to shorten the task’s 
original, non-interdicted duration.  
3. Solving the Attacker Problem with Decomposition 
Given a fixed set of attack values, kˆY , the resulting operator problem has a 
modified objective function: 
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 ˆmin Z = .01 _ c0finish k k k k
k k
EST COMPLETE pen skip SKIP Y      
If we solve the operator decision CPM model with this modified objective function for a 
particular attack, we will find the operator’s optimal response to that attack. This 
parameterized operator’s model (using (c0) as the objective and (a1)-(a4) as the 
constraints) becomes the subproblem in a decomposition algorithm for solving the 
attacker’s problem.  For any particular operational plan, given by values   kEST , 
 
kCOMPLETE , and   kSKIP , the expression 
        .01 _ d0finish k kk k
k k
EST COMPLETE pen skip SKIP Y     
calculates the processing time with delay (in days) an attacker can inflict on that 
particular operational plan, and therefore provides an upper bound on the amount of delay 
that can be inflicted in the worst-case scenario for any possible response the operator 
might have.  The corresponding master problem at any particular iteration, ITER, collects 
all of the operator plans seen so far (indexed by iteration number, iter) and creates a 





,k iterEST    Start time of each task in plan iter 
 
,k iterCOMPLETE   Indicates whether task k completed in plan iter 
 





















































The objective (m0) represents the most damage an attacker can do to the project 
network.  Each constraint (m1) is called a “cut” and provides an upper bound on that 
maximum damage based on a particular operational plan.  See Alderson et al. [25] for a 
detailed discussion of decomposition formulations and algorithms for solving Attacker-
Defender models. 
For the first iteration of the decomposition no tasks are attacked, and the resulting 
subproblem finds the fastest way to complete the non-interdicted project.  That plan is the 
added to the master, which is solved to determine the worst attack against it.  Every time 
a subproblem is solved the resulting objective value provides a lower bound on the 
damage an attacker can do (because it determines the operator’s best response to a 
particular attack), and that operational plan is added as a new cut to the master (m1). 
 Every time the master problem is solved it has one more constraint than in the 
previous iteration, and therefore the sequence of optimal objective values are non-
increasing, and each provides an upper bound on the optimal attack value.   
At each iteration we retain the best lower bound seen so far (and the 
corresponding incumbent attack), and we terminate if the difference between the upper 
bound and the best lower bound is within a tolerable number of days. 
Each time the sub-problem is solved, it produces one of these “cuts” which is then 
added to the master problem. If repeated operational plans are detected we add a set of 
solution elimination constraints to ensure a different path for project completion is 
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evaluated. We cannot use the resulting operational plans to create a lower bound on such 
an iteration, but that plan will add a valid cut to the master problem, ensuring the eventual 
convergence of the algorithm [25].   
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results of the DISTECH model, operating on both the Legacy and Advanced 
project networks, are summarized in Table 1. 











The DISTECH decision CPM model determines the optimal operator plan. The 
analyst is generally regarded as an attacker. Once the optimal operator path is chosen, the 
attacker extension implements an interdiction regime designed to inflict maximal delay 
on the operator. By comparing the ability of the attacker to lengthen the critical path of 
the operator model in both project models, an analyst can begin to make determinations 
as to whether a candidate technology is disruptive. The application of this model on two 
notional IED producing networks demonstrates how this process works. 
A. THE NON-INTERDICTED LEGACY PROJECT 
In order to illustrate the effects a disruptive technology will have on an 
adversary’s project network, one must first model a base case with no interdictions. First, 
we will examine what a project model might look like for a network engaged in the 
construction of anti-armor IEDs utilizing present-day technology, henceforth referred to 
as the legacy project. Specifically, this network is involved in acquiring explosives with 
high brisance like RDX (nitrated hexamine) that are suitable for forming high velocity 
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projectiles and plasma jets from a ductile metallic liner which is in turn capable of 
piecing heavy armor.  
Additionally, the legacy project must acquire primary explosives to initiate the 
explosive train and a booster explosive to ensure sufficient shock has been imparted to 
the secondary explosive (a.k.a. main charge). Access to commercial or military blasting 
caps can greatly aid any would-be bomb maker as they tend to be safer and more reliable. 
Access to such materials is closely regulated in the West as few legitimate uses exist 
outside of commercial demolition, mining and certain agricultural applications. 
Therefore, one must consider some of the common improvised methods of acquiring 
primary explosives for use in improvised blasting caps. In this case, we will consider 
common methods for acquiring a peroxide based home-made explosive, HMTD. HMTD 
is somewhat less sensitive to shock and friction than its peroxide based cousin TATP 
which was used in the 2005 London bombing which killed 56 and injured over 700 [26]–
[28]. Both explosives are easily improvised from common chemicals that have numerous 
legitimate uses; however, both explosives require considerable care in their 
manufacturing and handling [24], [27], [28]. Common household items that can be used 












Figure 4.  Possible Precursors for Explosives Manufacture 
 
Common household items that can be used as feedstocks for clandestine explosives 
manufacture are depicted above. An exhaustive list is virtually impossible to assemble. 
While the collection of large quantities of these precursors may be indicative of illicit 
activity, effective monitoring of purchases of such common items is exceedingly difficult 
and other indicators are likely needed.  
In order to complete the legacy project, the network must acquire the tools (lathe, 
hydraulic press, etc.) to produce the liners as well as an initiation mechanism. The 
potential combination of common materials that can be turned into an effective initiator 
are too numerous to count. Any conductive piece of metal can be used to close a simple 
electric firing circuit while common household items like exterior lighting motion sensors 
and cell phones have been used to initiate IEDs. Since the possibilities are so numerous, 
the tasks associated with the construction of such IED components are summarized into 
only a few generic tasks. Combining all these components completes the project. This 
task is visually depicted in the network as the “Assemble Device” node in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5.  The Invulnerable Project Network 
 
The non-interdicted Legacy model completes in 32.5 days, assuming the task durations 
provided in the model are reasonably accurate. This represents the “best case” scenario 
for an operator whom is assumed to be attempting to remain “undetected” throughout the 
acquisition of their required precursor materials. Dashed lines indicate choices on the part 
of the operator. Solid lines indicate tasks that must be completed after the operator has 
made a decision about which method to use in procuring a given bomb component.  
B. THE COMPLETELY VULNERABLE LEGACY PROJECT  
We next introduce a version of the Legacy project model where all tasks are 
vulnerable to interdiction. The attacker extension of the DISTECH model seeks to 
interdict those tasks which will maximally delay the project completion date. This 
particular attack set assumes the attacker has both a perfect knowledge of the operator’s 
network structure and a credible means of interdicting any given task.  
In the case of total vulnerability, the DISTECH attacker extension favors 
interdictions towards the end of the project, as illustrated in Figure 6. This is because 
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tasks in later stages of the project must be completed because there are no alternatives. 
This does not mean that no alternatives exist. Additionally, it is assumed that 
interdictions at this point in the project essentially destroy the IED network by capturing 
the bomb makers, their equipment and stores of precursor chemicals and ready-made 
explosives. This is reflected in DISTECH by making the delay associated with the 
interdiction of those tasks immense, thus stretching the length of the critical path to a 
virtual infinity. 
Figure 6.  The Completely Vulnerable Project Network 
 
Green borders represent vulnerable tasks in the project network. Large red circles 
indicate tasks interdicted by the DISTECH attacker extension. Attack budget has been set 
at two interdictions. 
 26
C. FEASIBLE INTERDICTION REGIMES OF THE LEGACY PROJECT 
Interdicting the most critical tasks in a network may not always be possible. This 
is especially true if the network operator is utilizing tools and materials that have 
numerous legitimate uses. Moreover, the attacker may lack the level of knowledge of the 
operator’s network structure and intentions required to carry out the type of attack in the 
previous interdiction regime. This is especially true in the era of self-radicalizing 
terrorism. 
One must thus consider how to impose delays on the operator model earlier in the 
project without highly detailed knowledge of its structure or the intentions of the 
operator. Such interdictions often take the form of regulations and licensing requirements 
or overt surveillance to discourage or prevent the operators of illicit networks from 
acquiring the tools necessary for advancing their agendas too easily. In the case of the 
legacy project network, such interdictions take the form of the ATF’s Limited User 
permitting for the purpose of screening individuals before purchasing blasting caps and 
other explosive materials [1]. Additionally, surveillance of known distributors of bulk 
amounts of common precursor substances like nitric acid or ammonium nitrate is 
considered to be plausibly implementable. Both actions impose significant delays on the 
operator as he must now pursue more clandestine methods of sourcing the required 
materials to make IEDs in any significant quantity.  
Restricting access to primary explosives via both licensing and physical security 
requirements lengthens the critical path by approximately 23% (40 days vice 32.5) as 
alternative procurement methods exist. Additionally, the operator is forced to procure 
nitric acid by first procuring other common acids like sulfuric acid (drain opener, car 
batteries) or hydrochloric acid (a.k.a. muriatic acid, used to clean pools) and distilling it 
with a nitrate salt like ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate, or sodium nitrate (e.g., 
instant cold packs, tree stump remover, saltpeter, curing salt). The operator is also forced 
to improvise primary explosives as his access to commercial and military grade blasting 
caps is now restricted. While the production of the primary explosives used in improvised 
blasting caps is relatively easy, it can be very dangerous to those not familiar with the 
process as the peroxide based primary explosives considered in this network are quite 
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sensitive to shock, friction and heat [27],[28]. Alternatives exist in the form of mercury 
fulminate and lead azide; however, their synthesis is not considered [24], [28]. All of 
these processes require the operator to expend considerable amounts of time to both 
acquire precursors and then manufacture the explosives.  
Some tasks are considered invulnerable to interdiction, such as those tasks 
associated with the “highly improvised” method of acquiring nitric acid. This method 
involves harvesting nitrate salts from nitrogen rich earth, a process recorded by Roger 
Bacon in 1267 [27]. Any nitrogen-rich soil (i.e., compost, dung, and soil mixtures from 
stables) can be used to extract potassium nitrate [24]. Clearly, no plausible means exists 
to prevent persons from gaining access to dirt, wood ashes, a bucket, and the other 
rudimentary supplies required to extract nitrate salts. Thus, tasks associated with such 
processes are considered invulnerable. While such processes are immune to the attacker’s 
interdiction efforts, they do require a significant amount of time to extract a useful 
amount of nitrate salts (see Figure 7) [24]. If the attacker can successfully force the 
operator to pursue such primitive methods, the attacker is doing very well indeed.  
Other tasks remain vulnerable in the legacy project network as well. For example, 
the bulk purchase of concentrated hydrogen peroxide (~20–30%) may serve as an 
indicator of illicit activity although not as clearly as nitric acid or explosives from 
licensed retailers. Concentrated hydrogen peroxide (CHP) solutions have various 
legitimate uses ranging from hydro and/or aquaponics to papermaking and many more. 
While likely to be time consuming, the monitoring of bulk CHP solutions and its vendors 
might be possible. Obviously, this burden can be considerably lightened if the attacker 
has other indicators of illicit activity or specific intelligence about the intentions of the 
network operator. When combined with the previous interdictions, the interdiction of 






Figure 7.  Primary Explosives and Nitric Acid Interdiction 
 
By simply restricting access to primary explosives (i.e., blasting caps) and monitoring 
large purchases of nitric acid, the critical path can be lengthened by approximately 23%. 










Figure 8.  Primary Explosives, Nitric Acid, and CHP Interdiction 
 
By limiting access to primary explosives and monitoring bulk nitric acid and CHP 
purchases, the critical path can be extended to 45 days, a 38% increase from the non-
interdicted network. Attack budget has been set at five interdictions. 
D. THE NON-INTERDICTED ADVANCED PROJECT 
We will now model a clandestine IED network that utilizes an advanced 3D 
printer capable of manufacturing molecules out of simple feedstocks of basic elements. 
By assessing the changes that take place in the network’s structure and task durations 
when a new technology is introduced we will be able to gain insight into whether a 
particular technology is disruptive or not. The non-interdicted advanced project network 
is able to complete its task much more quickly than the legacy project. In this case, it 
would require the network operator only 15 days to complete his project. 
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Figure 9.  The Non-Interdicted Advanced Project Network  
 
The non-interdicted advanced project network which utilizes advanced 3D printing 
technology. This project completes in as little as 15 days. 
E. TOTALLY VULNERABLE ADVANCED PROJECT 
The advanced project network is initially assessed as though it were totally 
vulnerable. Like the legacy project network, the DISTECH attacker extension favors 
“necking” tasks that all potential paths must pass through. In this case, if the attacker can 
again interdict the operators during final device assembly, the attacker effectively kills 
the advanced project network. It is plausible that an attacker might receive intelligence 
from some other source and interdict the operator during final device assembly. Again it 
is assumed that interdiction during this task effectively stretches the length of the critical 
path into infinity. If it could be assumed that an attacker could consistently interdict such 
a network during this phase of the project, an advanced 3D printer-enabled IED network 









Figure 10.  Totally Vulnerable Advanced Project Network 
 
If an attacker is able to interdict either of the tasks circled in red, the critical path 
effectively lengthens to infinity. If it were plausible to consistently interdict such a 
network during these stages of the project, advanced 3D printing technology would not 
be considered disruptive. 
F. FEASIBLE INTERDICTION REGIMES OF THE ADVANCED PROJECT 
It is unlikely an attacker would consistently possess the level of knowledge 
required to continually interdict the advanced project model at the points specified above. 
To that end, more plausible interdiction efforts appeal. Experts currently debate whether 
the regulation of the advanced chemical “inks” required by such machines would be 
effective in the long term [29]. Additionally, it would seem intuitive that operators would 
want printers capable of working with a wide range of basic elements for maximum 
utility. Since compounds found in explosives typically consist of chemical bonds of 
elements like hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, and oxygen, which all have an innumerable 
amount of legitimate uses in day-to-day life, clandestine activity would likely hide in 
plain sight. Thus, another method for attacking or delaying the operator must be 
considered. 
It is widely believed the Stuxnet computer virus was developed during the Bush 
administration to sabotage the Iranian nuclear weapons project. Sometime in 2010, the 
Obama administration is thought to have authorized its deployment against the Natanz 
nuclear facility in Iran as a means of delaying the Iranians from enriching enough 
weapons grade uranium to develop a nuclear weapon [30], [31]. Similar attacks might be 
possible against networks employing advanced 3D printers. Since the operator must 
either acquire the advanced CAD files required to make explosives or design them 
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himself, the attacker might consider installing malicious code analogous to Stuxnet into 
CAD files for explosives and posting them online. Such malicious code might also 
contain advanced spyware to help the attacker better determine the network structure of 
the project model or to help reveal those who might be collaborating with the operator. If 
the operator then attempts to utilize the CAD files he has acquired online, a Stuxnet-like 
virus might activate and render the printer useless. 
Figure 11.   “Stuxnet” Interdiction and Spyware Insertion 
 
The attacker inserts a computer virus analogous to Stuxnet into the CAD files for 
explosives and distributes them liberally online in known online extremist forums and 
file-sharing websites. This attack “enters” the project network via the downloading of the 
files and interdicts the project at the 3D printer itself. Spyware may also be inserted into 
the file to help the attacker find other nefarious actors.  
The magnitude of such a delay is hard to quantify. The virus effectively renders 
the printer useless and breaks the network. The delay inflicted on the operator is thus 
equal to the amount of time it takes him to acquire a new printer. This may prove difficult 
as the operator may have tipped off the attacker about his activities by downloading and 
executing the infected files. In such a case, the critical path once again is lengthened to 
infinity and the network is effectively destroyed. 
A plausible alternative for the operator will depend on the sophistication of 
advanced CAD software that supports the printing of complex molecules. If the 
sophistication of the software matches that of the printer, it may very well be plausible 
that the operator could “build” the explosives himself from common text books and 
references. Doing so would allow the operator to keep the most critical piece of network 
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infrastructure, the advanced 3D printer, offline and unconnected and thus limit its 
vulnerability to any form of cyberattack. This results in the overall completion being 
delayed from 15 days to 20 days. 
G. FINAL DETERMINATION 
To make the final determination as to whether a technology is truly disruptive, an 
analyst must now consider the amount of delay the attacker can plausibly impart on 
the two separate networks. In this case, the legacy network can be delayed an additional 
12.5 days until all tasks are completed resulting in a total completion time of 45 days vice 
32.5. The advanced project model utilizing advanced 3D printing technologies to 
manufacture explosives can only have its critical path lengthened from 15 to 20 days. 
Thus, since the advanced project network completes all required tasks even after the 
attacker’s interdiction efforts far faster than the legacy network under any circumstance, 
advanced 3D printing technology would earn the designation of “disruptive.” 
This may not always be the case, however. As both the network operator and the 
network attacker constantly develop new capabilities, any given technology or process 
that was once considered disruptive may lose that designation. This implies that new 
assessments will be required as new capabilities emerge. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is much more to be hoped for in an excess of information or of 
weapons than in the restriction of information or arms control. 
       —Jean Baudrillard 
Disruptive technologies shorten critical paths and/or make them more resistant to 
interdiction. Any network that utilizes a technology that fits this definition is inherently 
more difficult to delay, degrade, or destroy. The DISTECH model allows an interested 
party to quantify the magnitude of the resultant changes in project network structure and 
resilience. In doing so, it offers insight on how one might respond to, or cope with said 
disruptions. The rapidly implementable, quantitative analysis provided by this process 
can also suggest ways to organize and manage new intelligence and capabilities 
requirements to combat nefarious actors who employ them while side-stepping some of 
the pitfalls associated with trying to predict the future. 
To illustrate the effects such a technology might have, we have introduced a 
project management model of two networks that represent the production of IEDs, one 
utilizing present-day technology and the other, advanced 3D printers to manufacture key 
components. We demonstrate how the present-day network may be significantly 
degraded by attacking tasks and how inflicting similar delays on the network employing 
advanced technologies is very difficult. In this particular case, we were able to lengthen 
the critical path of the legacy project by 12.5 days for a total duration of 45 days. We 
were only able to delay the advanced project model 5 days for a total duration of 20 days. 
Whether considering the relative magnitude of delay or the absolute value of the time 
until total project completion, the advanced network’s use of 3D printers is clearly 
disruptive. 
Not every new technology is disruptive. Previously, we mentioned the disruptive 
effects of the printing press. Had the ballpoint pen been invented in the middle of the 
15th century instead of the printing press, it is possible the social upheavals of the time 
might not have reached the same magnitude, as skilled scribes would still have been 
 36
required to expend many man-hours replicating controversial texts and the texts would 
thus have reached fewer hands. 
Just because a technology fits the definition of being disruptive, this does not 
make it inherently bad. The printing press, perhaps the most disruptive technology of its 
day, contributed greatly to the advancement of ideas that at the time were considered 
radical and helped fuel conflicts that would devastate Europe in the middle of the last 
millennia. When one looks back through history, however, one realizes that the easily 
replicable process of information distribution also contributed greatly to the spread of 
scientific knowledge. By making texts cheaply replicable, commoners could now afford 
to read which in turn increased the demand for education among common people. How 
much further might human cultural and scientific progress lag behind today if the printing 
press had not disrupted the legacy network of manuscript production in the 15th century?  
Future disruptive technologies will likely have similar negative consequences 
when they immerge. But they will have positive effects as well. Because of the myriad of 
beneficial incentives that drive the creation of many of these technologies, it is likely that 
the beneficial uses of these technologies will grossly outweigh the detrimental ones, just 
as the uses of the printing press did. It would therefore be a mistake to reflexively move 
to restrict access to such technologies or otherwise stifle their development because 
someone might do something undesirable with them.  
Furthermore, one must acknowledge that creating mayhem is already an industry 
with fairly low barriers to entry. Why then do we see relatively little of it in the 
classically liberal societies of the West?  Again, participating in modern society offers the 
individual a multitude of incentives as compared to the dangerous and uncertain 
alternatives offered by the use of violence. As long as persons remain relatively free from 
coercion, history appears to suggest that the rewards of innovation, profit, and self-
fulfillment are far more alluring.  
Disruptive technologies will push back the bounds of areas in life where coercion 
and institutional mediation are tolerated. People will likely become ever more powerful 
agents in the creation of their own worlds [32]. Attempting to interfere in this process 
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will likely retard human social and technological progress while simultaneously inviting 
the very backlash that the modern “clergy” of legislators and legacy corporations seem to 
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